



# A Threat to the Peace

## *North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam*

**PART II—The Appendices**

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# **A Threat to the Peace**

## ***North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam***

**In Two Parts**

**PART II—The Appendices**

**PART I—A separate publication—  
is the report which refers  
to these appendices**

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

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## APPENDIX A

**Direction of the Viet Cong by North Viet-Nam**

(See Part I, section IV, pp. 14-18)

The Government and the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam provide support and encouragement to the illegal movement to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Communist Party, called the Lao Dong (Workers) Party in North Viet-Nam, provides the ideological orientation of the so-called "liberation movement" in South Viet-Nam.

The following excerpts from Lao Dong Party declarations and from the articles and speeches of party and government officials in Hanoi demonstrate clearly the leading role played by North Viet-Nam in the Viet Cong campaign in the South:

1. From the resolution of the 3d National Congress of the Lao Dong (Workers) Party of Viet-Nam adopted at Hanoi on September 10, 1960:

"1. The Third National Congress of the Party unanimously finds that over the past nine years and more, from the Second Congress to the third, under the leadership of the party, the Vietnamese revolution has won big victories. . . .

"The people's democratic power, more and more consolidated, is a strong instrument for fulfilling the tasks of proletarian dictatorship and speeding up socialist transformation and socialist construction in the North; at the same time, it is a firm base for our whole people in their struggle for the strengthening of peace and the achievement of national reunification. Under the leadership of the party, the People's Army has vigorously developed its revolutionary character, scored new achievements in study and in work, and made steady progress in turning itself into a regular and modern army.

"The national united front has been consolidated, the worker-peasant alliance strengthened. The Viet-Nam fatherland front and the political parties and mass organizations, members of the front, have made active contributions to the cause of socialist revolution in the North and the struggle for national reunification.

"In the South, our compatriots' struggle against the American imperialists and their agents, the Ngo Dinh Diem clique, though facing many difficulties, is being firmly maintained and further expanded day by day. Our people throughout the country have united closely in their struggle and enjoy worldwide sympathy and support. The American imperialists and their henchmen are more and more isolated. . . .

"Since the reestablishment of peace and the complete liberation of the North, the Vietnamese revolution has shifted over to a new stage. Under the leadership of the party, the North is advancing by firm steps toward socialism; it has strengthened its forces in all fields and become the bulwark of the nationwide revolution. Meanwhile, the U.S. imperialists and the Ngo Dinh Diem clique have set up a despotic and warlike administration in the South and turned it into a colony of a new type and a military base of the American imperialists. They are hampering and sabotaging the cause of national reunification of our people.

"In the present stage, the Vietnamese revolution has two strategic tasks: first, to carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam; second, to liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country. These two strategic tasks are closely related to each other and spur each other forward.

"To take the North toward socialism is a necessary and unavoidable task following the completion of the national people's democratic revolution. To take the North toward socialism and make it more and more powerful in every field will benefit the revolutionary movement for the liberation of the South, the development of the revolution throughout the country, and the preservation and consolidation of peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world. Therefore, to carry out the socialist revolution in the North, in the South we

must endeavor to rally all national and democratic forces, expand and consolidate the national unity bloc, isolate the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, and speed up the struggle to strengthen peace and reunify our fatherland. That is why the guiding principle of the socialist revolution in the North is: To build the North and take the South into due consideration.

"In the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country and the achievement of national reunification, our compatriots in the South have the task of directly overthrowing the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their agents. The revolutionary struggle of our compatriots in the South also aims at frustrating the attempt of the U.S.-Diem clique to rekindle war, and making an active contribution to the defense of peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world. That is why the struggle of our southern compatriots against the U.S.-Diem clique for the liberation of the South has a decisive and direct effect on the liberation of the South, the achievement of national reunification, and the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country.

"The two revolutionary tasks of the North and the South belong to two different strategies, each task being aimed at satisfying the definite requirement of each zone under the specific conditions of our divided country. But these two tasks have one common aim—to achieve peaceful national reunification and resolve one common contradiction of our whole country—the contradiction between our people and the imperialists and their henchmen.

"The common task of the Vietnamese revolution at present is: to strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace, to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam; and to contribute practically to reinforcing the socialist camp and to maintaining peace in Southeast Asia and in the world. . . .

"The immediate task of the revolution in the South is to achieve the unity of the whole people, to fight resolutely against the aggressive and war-mongering U.S. imperialists, to overthrow the

dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem ruling clique, lackeys of the democratic coalition government in South Viet-Nam, to win national independence and establish democratic freedoms, to improve the people's livelihood, to safeguard peace, to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy, and to make an active contribution to the defense of peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

"The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary power of the masses. During this process we must pay special attention to the work of organizing and educating the people, first and foremost the workers, peasants and intellectuals, promoting to the highest degree the revolutionary fighting spirit of the various strata of our patriotic countrymen. We must unceasingly expose the criminal schemes and acts of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, doing our utmost to divide and isolate them.

"To insure the complete success of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam our people there must strive to establish a united bloc of workers, peasants, and soldiers and to bring into being a broad national united front directed against the U.S.-Diem clique and based on the worker-peasant alliance. This front must rally all the patriotic classes and sections of the people, the majority and minority nationalities, all patriotic parties and religious groupings, together with all individuals inclined to oppose the U.S.-Diem clique. The aims of its struggle are peace, national independence, democratic freedoms, improvement of the people's living conditions, and peaceful national reunification.

"The front must carry out its work in a very flexible manner in order to rally all forces that can be rallied, win over all forces that can be won over, neutralize all forces that should be neutralized, and draw the broad masses into the general struggle against the U.S.-Diem clique for the liberation of the South and the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

"The revolutionary movement in the South plays a very important role in relation to the reunification of the country. Simultaneously with the effort to build the North and advance toward socialism our people must strive to maintain and

develop the revolutionary forces in the South and create favorable conditions for peaceful national reunification. . . .”

2. From the speech of Ho Chi Minh at the opening session of the Lao Dong Party's 3d Congress in Hanoi, September 5, 1960:

“In the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and private capitalist industry and commerce, we have won a victory of a decisive character. We have recorded many achievements on the agricultural and industrial production fronts, and in cultural and educational work, and have made improvements in the people's living standards. The North is becoming more and more consolidated and transformed into a firm base for the struggle for national reunification. The big victories won over the past 9 years have testified to the correctness of our party's line and the firmness of our party's leadership. They are victories of Marxism-Leninism in a country which has suffered imperialist oppression and exploitation. Our party is worthy of the confidence of our people from north to south.

“Our party can be proud to be the heir to our people's glorious traditions, and the guide of our people on the road to a bright future. . . .

“The victories of the Vietnamese revolution are due also to the wholehearted assistance of the fraternal socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and China. We avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our warm feelings of gratitude toward the fraternal socialist countries headed by the great Soviet Union. We are also sincerely grateful to other fraternal parties, first of all, to the French Communist Party, for their active support to our people's just struggle. We sincerely thank all colonial peoples and peace-loving people throughout the world, who have always given us their sympathy and support.

“The history of the 30-year-long struggle of our party has taught us this: the best guarantee of victory for the revolution is to steep ourselves in Marxism-Leninism; to remain loyal to the interests of the working class and the people; to preserve solidarity and unity of mind within the party and between all Communist parties and all countries of the big socialist family. . . .

“A prosperous and strong North is the firm base of the struggle for national reunification. This congress will shed new light on our people's

revolutionary path to peaceful national reunification. Our nation is one, our country is one. Our people will undoubtedly overcome all difficulties, achieve national reunification and bring the North and the South together again.”

“Dear comrades, the Vietnamese revolution is a part of the world forces of peace, democracy, and socialism. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is a member of the big socialist family headed by the great Soviet Union. It is our duty to defend the advance post of socialism in Southeast Asia, to endeavor to contribute to the strengthening of the forces of the socialist camp, and to safeguard peace in Southeast Asia and the world. . . .”

3. From an article by Ho Chi Minh in the Belgian Communist publication *Red Flag*, July 10, 1959:

“We are building socialism in Viet-Nam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution.”

4. From the speech of Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap to the Lao Dong Party's 3d Congress in Hanoi, September 12, 1960:

“The August general uprisings [against the French] are a model of successful uprisings in a colonial and semifeudal country and a model of a clever association between political and armed struggles and between the political forces of the masses and the revolutionary armed forces.

“The success of the August general uprisings proves that under the present world situation, the liberation struggle by the people of a colonial country—under fixed historic conditions—can be brought to a successful conclusion through the channel of uprisings. This is an experience having a creative character which has been daily proved by the rich realities of the people's liberation movements over the past few years. . . .

“These successes and experiences give us this lesson: to be successful, the armed struggle and the building of armed forces must be guided by correct political lines and the armed struggle must serve the objectives of the political struggle. Indeed, during the whole process of its leadership over the armed struggle, our party kept a firm hold on the national democratic revolutionary line and cor-

rectly associated the anti-imperialist responsibility with the antifeudal responsibility, thus achieving brilliant successes. At the same time, we have fully understood that 'to build and consolidate our armed forces is one of the important conditions enabling our revolution to defeat any aggressive enemy, protect, and develop its achievements,' as stated in the political report.

"Under the lively conditions of our people's liberation struggle, our party has set forth a correct policy concerning the revolutionary armed struggle and on the building of the revolutionary armed forces: it is the policy of people's war and people's army. The major significance of this policy lies in the fact that our party has cleverly and creatively applied the general principles of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete realities of the revolutionary struggle in a former colonial and semifeudal country like ours. This is the cause of all successes achieved by our party. . . .

"After thoroughly surveying the international and domestic situation, the political report of the party Central Committee sets forth the revolutionary task to be carried out by our people in the present phase as follows: 'to strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace; to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy, to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam, and to contribute practically to reinforcing the socialist camp and to maintaining peace in south-east Asia and in the world. . . .'"

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5. From an article by Vo Nguyen Giap in the Lao Dong Party journal *Hoa Tap*, January 1960 issue:

"The North has become a large rear echelon of our army. . . . The North is the revolutionary base for the whole country."

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6. From the political report of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party delivered at the Party's 3d Congress in Hanoi by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Committee, on September 5, 1960:

"At present our party is facing momentous tasks: to promote socialist construction in the

North and to consolidate the North into an ever more solid base for the struggle for national reunification; to strive to complete the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country, to liberate the South from the atrocious rule of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, prosperous, and strong Viet-Nam. To guarantee the full execution of these tasks, we must make our party even stronger and must strengthen the leadership of the party. The present national congress of the party will define for the whole party and the whole people the line for carrying out the socialist revolution in the North, for the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country, for the struggle to achieve national reunification; at the same time it will decide upon the basic orientation for the building of the party and for the strengthening of party leadership to meet the new requirements of the revolution.

"The Second National Congress of our party was the congress of resistance for national salvation. The present national congress is the congress of construction of socialism in the North and of struggle for the achievement of national reunification. It will open up the road to new victories for the people throughout our country. . . .

"The socialist revolution is carried out in the North while in the South we have to make every effort to achieve a broad national unity embracing all national and democratic forces, all forces opposed to the U.S. imperialists and Ngo Dinh Diem. In building and consolidating the North, we must on the one hand keep firmly to the line of socialist construction and, on the other, pay the greatest attention to the situation in the South, help create further conditions for the rallying of all patriotic forces opposed to the U.S.-Diem regime in the South into a broad national united front with the worker-peasant alliance as its basis, and insure the victory of the revolutionary struggle in the South. Our guiding principle in carrying out the socialist revolution in the North is: consolidate the North, and in so doing, take the South into due consideration. . . .

"The North is the common revolutionary base of the whole country. Its constant strengthening not only heightens the confidence and stimulates the revolutionary enthusiasm of our patriotic



countrymen in the South but also helps the balance of forces between revolution and counter-revolution on a national scale to tip over to the side of revolution, creating favorable conditions for the powerful development and final victory of the revolution in the South. Besides, since the North is the common revolutionary base of the whole country, the socialist revolution in the North aims not only at building a new life for the northern people but also at laying the foundations of a new life full of freedom and happiness for our entire nation and at preparing effectively the future development of the revolution throughout the country. . . .

“. . . the southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal—and based on the building, consolidation and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the South—especially the workers, peasants, and the intellectuals—and must uphold the revolutionary fighting spirit of all strata of patriotic compatriots. We must ceaselessly unmask the perfidious and cruel schemes of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys with a view to isolating them further, and winning over the forces that can be won over. On the basis of developing the great revolutionary force of the masses and uniting closely with the peace-loving peoples of the world, we must struggle tenaciously for the implementation of the Geneva agreements.

“In order to assure the complete victory of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam, the South Viet-Nam people, under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Party and the working class, should endeavor to build a worker-peasant-army coalition bloc, and set up a broad national united front against the U.S.-Diem clique on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance. This front must be able to unite all patriotic classes and strata, the delta and minority peoples, all patriotic parties and religions, and all those who have anti-U.S.-Diem tendencies. The aims of the struggle of the national united front against the U.S.-Diem clique in South Viet-Nam are peace, national independence, democratic freedoms, improvement of the people's livelihood, and peaceful reunification of the fatherland. The activities of the front

must be extremely varied in order to unite all forces that can be united and win over all the forces that can be won over, neutralize the forces that must be neutralized, and draw the masses of the people into the common struggle against the U.S.-Diem clique.

“The revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam has a very important position in the cause of national reunification. Parallel with the building and consolidation of North Viet-Nam, bringing it to socialism, our people should endeavor to maintain and develop the revolutionary forces in South Viet-Nam, thus creating favorable conditions for the peaceful reunification of the country. . . .”

7. From an article by Truong Chinh, a member of the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party, in the journal *Hoc Tap* for April 1961:

“Thus the resolutions of the Third National Party Congress have clearly set forth two strategic responsibilities of the Vietnamese revolution:

“1. ‘To carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam’;

“2. ‘To liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country.’

“These two strategic responsibilities aim at satisfying the objective and concrete requirements of each zone while our country is temporarily partitioned. But they also aim at solving a problem: to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam. Thus the Third National Party Congress set forth the general responsibilities of the present Vietnamese revolution:

“‘To strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace; to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam; and to contribute practically to reinforcing the socialist camp and to maintaining peace in southeast Asia and in the world. . . .’

"Inside the country, the responsibilities of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam and those of the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam are also closely related and interdependent. Indeed, the success of the socialist revolution and construction in North Viet-Nam will not only consolidate North Viet-Nam and bring a peaceful, free, and happy life to the northern people, but it will also strongly encourage southern compatriots to struggle against the U.S.-Diemists, to liberate South Viet-Nam, and to achieve national reunification. On the other hand, each success of the National People's Democratic Revolution in South Viet-Nam has two effects: (1) to struggle against the U.S.-Diemists, restore to the southern people the right to earn their daily living, advance toward liberating South Viet-Nam from the imperialist and feudal yoke, and create favorable conditions for peacefully reunifying the country; and (2) to help protect revolutionary bases common to the entire country and to encourage the northern compatriots to do their best to build socialism.

"It is precisely because of this interdependence between the revolutionary responsibilities in the two zones that the congress has set forth this slogan for North Viet-Nam: 'Build North Viet-Nam and pay attention to the South.' One of the important points in the present propaganda, mobilization, and ideological education work in North Viet-Nam is to turn the hatred for the U.S.-Diemists into practical actions in order to step up the patriotic emulation movement and the building of socialism in North Viet-Nam.

"The Political report of the Central Committee to the congress said:

"The responsibilities of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam are obviously the most decisive responsibilities in the development of the entire revolution in our country and in the national reunification work of our people.'

"Why? First of all, because North Viet-Nam is the revolutionary base common to the entire country, and the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam not only seeks to build a peaceful, free, and happy life for the northern people but also lays the foundation for the building of a peaceful, free, and happy life for all the people throughout the country; and prepares practically for the future development of the entire country.

"After determining the role and responsibilities of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam, the congress set forth the role and responsibilities of the National People's Democratic Revolution in South Viet-Nam, which are: to overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in order to liberate South Viet-Nam and fulfill the responsibilities of the National People's Democratic Revolution throughout the country. . . .

"From a passive state, our people in South Viet-Nam are advancing to take the initiative. They have exhaustively exploited the difficulties encountered by the Ngo Dinh Diem authorities, especially since the November 1960 coup d'etat. Forms of struggle are multiplying daily; political struggles are being closely associated with military struggles. . . .

"The deadly enemies of our people do not resign themselves to dying. As long as they live, they will resort to all plots and measures to oppress and terrorize the revolutionary forces in South Viet-Nam, hoping to destroy them and provoke North Viet-Nam. Their plots will be thwarted and they will be destroyed only by the vigorous struggle of our people in South Viet-Nam as well as in North Viet-Nam, and by the positive support of the peace- and justice-loving people the world over. We are very enthusiastic over the development of the revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam. However, we must understand that the struggle against the U.S.-Diemists to liberate South Viet-Nam is still arduous and complicated.

"However, we are firmly convinced that the revolution in South Viet-Nam and the struggle to achieve peaceful national reunification will surely succeed because they are evolving under these favorable conditions: socialist North Viet-Nam is being rapidly consolidated and strengthened, is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as a strong basis for the struggle for national reunification; the peaceful and socialist forces the world over are stronger than the warlike imperialist forces; and the colonial system of imperialism is disintegrating rapidly and is advancing toward destruction. . . .

"Unable to endure the oppressive, exploiting, and murderous policies of the enemy, southern compatriots have to rise and group themselves under the fighting banner of the Liberation Front to destroy the U.S.-Diemist regime and set up a National Democratic Coalition Government. Once established, this government will agree with

the DRV Government about achieving peaceful national reunification under one form or another, including the holding of free elections throughout the country. Thus, though South Viet-Nam will be liberated by nonpeaceful means, the Party policy of achieving peaceful national reunification is still correct. It is precisely because of the revolutionary struggle of southern compatriots to overthrow the U.S.-Diemists and to liberate Viet-Nam that there are favorable conditions to carry out the policy of achieving peaceful national reunification.

“The development of the revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam is fully consistent with the following view of the Moscow Declaration of November 1960:


“The presence of the world socialist system and the weakening of imperialist position have opened for all the oppressed new possibilities to recover independence. The recovery of independence by colonial people through peaceful or nonpeaceful means depends on the concrete conditions of each country.’ . . .”

APPENDIX B

The Viet Cong Organization in North and South Viet-Nam


(See Part I, section V, pp. 18-22)

1. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE VIET CONG:




APPENDIX B (Cont.)

2. TYPICAL INTER-PROVINCE ORGANIZATION OF THE VIET CONG




3. ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL RESEARCH AGENCY OF THE VIET CONG




APPENDIX B (Cont.)

4. ORGANIZATION OF A TYPICAL  
VC INTELLIGENCE CENTER



5. SPECIAL TARGETS FOR PENETRATION BY VIET CONG INTELLIGENCE AGENTS





The An Don Case


(See Part I, section VI, B, 1, pp. 25-26)



Map showing the route from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam taken by the Viet Cong agents in the An Don Case.



*Viet Cong agents captured at An Don on June 5, 1961. (Left to right: Lam Dua, Nguyen Chuc, Huynh Tinh, Nguyen Dong, and Truong Van Hao.)*



*The junk that Nguyen Chuc and his comrades used to carry agents and messages between the Viet Cong base at Dong Hoi and landing sites in South Viet-Nam.*

**B** LỜI KHAI CUNG CỐ KHẨU  
của

Tên NGUYỄN CHỨC bí danh NGHIỆP hay tên gia là  
NGUYỄN THỊ Trung-Ủy quân đội V.C., bị bắt  
tại An Đôn (HL.040.790) ngày 5/6/1961  
lúc 18 giờ 30



I)- ĐƠN LÝ LỊCH:

Họ và tên : NGUYỄN CHỨC tên gia NGUYỄN THỊ.  
Bí danh : NGHIỆP.  
Sinh năm : 1927 (34 tuổi).  
Sinh quán : Thôn 1 xã Duy Nghĩa, huyện Duy Xuyên,  
tỉnh Quảng Nam.  
Tên cha : NGUYỄN TÙNG.  
Tên mẹ : VÕ THỊ LINH.  
Chức vụ : Trung-Ủy, trong quân đội V.C.  
Quốc tịch : Việt-Nam.  
Tình trạng gia đình : có vợ, 2 con  
Lý do bị bắt : Thành phần tập kết và quân đội V.C. bố trí  
vào Namhoạt động.  
Ngày bị bắt : 5/6/1961 lúc 18 giờ 30.

II)- CÁI TRÌNH HOẠT ĐỘNG :

a)- Trước ngày định chiến :

Năm 1945 - 1947 : theo gia đình đến quân đội vợ xã  
Duy Nghĩa, huyện Duy Xuyên, Quảng  
NAM

..../...2

Preliminary Statement  
of

NGUYEN CHUC, alias Nghiep or Nguyen Thi, a lieutenant in the Viet Cong Army, who was arrested at An Don at 1830 hours on June 5, 1961

I. Personal History

Name : Nguyen Chuc alias Nguyen Thi  
Secret name : Nghiep  
Year of birth : 1927 (34 years old)  
Place of birth : Hamlet 1, Duy Nghia township, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province  
Father's name : Nguyen Tung  
Mother's name : Vo Thi Lang  
Occupation : Lieutenant in the Viet Cong Army  
Nationality : Viet-Nam  
Family status : Married, 2 children  
Reason for arrest : A regrouped person who was assigned to carry out activities in the South by the Viet Cong  
Date of arrest : June 5, 1961, at 1830 hours

II. Chronology of activities

A. *Before the ceasefire (1954)*

1945-47 : Was in the self-defense militia of Duy Nghia township, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province

#### Excerpts from remainder of Nguyen Chuc's confession

- 1947-49 : In charge of a transportation office in the South
- 1949-53 : In charge of transportation work in the Nam Dong area
- 1953-55 : At home ill

#### B. *After the ceasefire*

Regrouped to the North in January 1955. Taken to Thanh Hoa Province. Inducted into the 2d Battalion stationed at Thieu Hoa. Battalion was part of the 55th Regiment. Assumed duties of commander of Third Platoon of the 1st Company commanded by Nguyen Khuong.

From December 1955 to 1958, studied at the construction branch at Gia Lam and after graduating was assigned to work on camp construction.

In 1959 was assigned by the North Vietnamese High Command to carry documents into South Viet-Nam and was given training to prepare for the assignment.

#### III. His Story of Crossing the (17th) Parallel

I worked for the first time in South Viet-Nam in June 1959, and from then until May 1961 made 17 trips to the South.

There were five of us who worked in South Viet-Nam:

1. Nguyen Chuc alias Nguyen Thi (the subject)
2. Huynh Tinh alias Le Nghe
3. Truong Van Hao alias Ding Dai
4. Nguyen Dong alias Nguyen Tham
5. Lam Dua alias Le Lam

Traveled by boat No. T 02. The boat was built mainly by Nguyen Dong. . . .

The false inspection cards we brought in in order to carry out activities in the South were distributed at Dong Hoi by [men named] Nguyen Vinh and Binh.

The trip by boat from Dong Hoi to Tourane took only 3 days.

On our trips across the parallel to work in South Viet-Nam, we usually docked at [one of] three places:

1. Lang Co
2. Trem (Tourane)
3. An Don (the An Chanh section of Tourane)

Whenever the boat docked at a port, I [Chuc] went ashore alone to establish contact, usually for half an hour. The other four men waited in the boat. . . . On each trip across the parallel into South Viet-Nam I brought documents in from the North and received documents from the South to take out.


The documents brought from North to South Viet-Nam were usually rolled up in an aluminum tube about 10 centimeters long and 2 centimeters in diameter.

#### IV. Contacts on Shore

(Chuc listed the names and addresses at which he made contacts in South Viet-Nam with Viet Cong agents from June 1959 to June 1961. He also admitted transporting at least two Viet Cong agents between North and South Viet-Nam.)

**B** **ẢNH KHAI CUNG SỞ KHỚP**  
của

Tên **HUYỀN TÍCH** ( tên gia là **HUYỀN TÍNH** )  
cán bộ V.C vượt tuyến vào Nam hoạt-dộng và bị  
bắt ngày 5/6/61 tại ĐÀ NẴNG.



**I.- PHẦN LÝ LỊCH :**


<u>Họ và tên</u>	: <b>HUYỀN TÍNH</b> bí danh <b>LE NGHE</b>
<u>Ngày sinh</u>	: 38 tuổi
<u>Nơi sinh</u>	: Đay Nghĩa, Đay Xuyên, Quảng Nam
<u>Con ông</u>	: <b>HUYỀN LÂM</b> (c)
<u>Và bà</u>	: <b>PHẠM THỊ LÂM</b>
<u>Vợ</u>	: <b>NGUYỄN THỊ NHÌ</b> , 34 tuổi, ở làng
<u>Con trai</u>	: <b>HUYỀN THU</b> , 5 tuổi, ở làng
<u>Học lực</u>	: biết đọc biết viết
<u>Xu hướng chính trị</u>	: Gia nhập Mặt Trận Liên Việt 1952 ở Đay Nghĩa do tên <b>HÌNH</b> cán bộ xa (tập kết) giới thiệu.
<u>Tôn giáo</u>	: Phật giáo
<u>Tiền án chính trị</u>	: Không
<u>Ma</u>	: <b>HUYỀN THỊ TÍNH</b> 37 tuổi, buôn bán, vợ lẽ tên (Trần) Tỵ, huyện Thăng- Bình - Quảng-Nam. - <b>HUYỀN THỊ BÌNH</b> , 36 tuổi, buôn bán, vợ tên <b>NGUYỄN SĨ</b> ở Đay-Xuyên. - <b>HUYỀN THỊ KỶ</b> , 32 tuổi, cô chồng đi lính cho chính phủ VNCH ở bên HỒI-AN - <b>HUYỀN THỊ LIÊU</b> , 30 tuổi, làm ruộng, chồng tên là <b>TRẦN ĐỘ</b> , thanh-niên Cộng-hòa xa Đay-Nghĩa. - <b>HUYỀN SỬ</b> , 20 tuổi, nghe nói đã lính cho chính phủ VNCH.

...../.....

P ẢN KHAI CUNG  
của


tên NGUYỄN-ĐÔNG, can hoạt-động cho V.C tại ĐÀ-NẰNG, bị bắt ngày 5/6/1961 trên ghe đậu tại bến AN-ĐƠN (ĐÀ-NẰNG).

I.- PHẦN LÝ-LỊCH :



- Họ tên : NGUYỄN-ĐÔNG (tên thể kiểm-tra giả)  
ĐƯƠNG-ĐÔNG ( -nt- )  
NGUYỄN-THẨM (tên thật)
- Ngày và nơi sinh : Năm 1903 tại Làng HÒA-THANH-HẠ, Quận TAM-KỶ, Tỉnh QUẢNG-NAM.
- Nghề-nghiệp : Làm chài lưới (đi biển).
- Địa-chỉ hiện tại : Cho một cái lều ở bờ sông gần lò rèn và nhà thờ Thiên-Chúa-giáo ở Thị-xã ĐÔNG-HỚI (QUẢNG-BÌNH).
- Cha - Mẹ : NGUYỄN-ĐẮ (chết) và TRẦN-THỊ-LOÀNG (c).
- Vợ con : HUỖNH-THỊ-PHÔNG, 57 tuổi, làm nghề đi biển, hiện ở Làng HÒA-THANH-HẠ, Quận TAM-KỶ, Tỉnh QUẢNG-NAM. Hai con là : NGUYỄN-THỊ-CHÂU 24 tuổi, làm nữ cứu-thương cho bộ-đội V.C từ năm 1952 hiện nay không rõ ở đâu. NGUYỄN-BA 19 tuổi làm lưới ở VỎI-MÈ tại Làng HÒA-THANH-HẠ (QUẢNG-NAM).
- Anh em ruột : Không có ai.
- Cha Mẹ vợ : HUỖNH-TỐT (chết) và Bà LÊ-THỊ ... (chết)
- Anh em vợ : Không có ai.
- Tôn giáo : Đạo Phật.
- Trình-độ học lục : Biết chữ Quốc-ngữ nhưng không thông thạo.
- Xu-hướng chính-trị : Không theo Đảng phái nào nhưng nghe lời tuyên-truyền của V.C nên theo V.C vượt-tuyên ra Miền BẮC VĨ-TUYÊN 17.
- Tiền - án : Không.

... / ...



1- AN KHAI CUNG SE KHOI

CỦA TÊN LAM DƯ, TÊN GIẢ' LÊ LAM (trong kiểm-tra)  
bị bắt tại AN BÓN (BT.040.790 - NAI HIEM -  
QUẢNG NAM) ngày 5/6/61 lúc 18 G 30.

I.- PHẦN LÝ LỊCH

Tên, họ : LAM DƯ bí danh không có  
tên giả trong thẻ kiểm-tra: LÊ LAM.  
Đảng-viên Cộng-sản: 10 tuổi đảng, vào đảng CS năm 1952 do  
sự giới-thiệu của :  
- tên LÊ VĂN ĐEM, Ủy-viên Thường vụ Khu ĐÔNG -  
HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.  
- tên TRƯƠNG UYÊN, Phường-trưởng ở Khu ĐÔNG -  
HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.  
Sinh năm: 1929 (32 tuổi) tại Khu ĐÔNG, HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.  
Tên cha : LAM ĐƯỢC (chết năm 1953)  
Nghề-nghiệp người cha: làm cá tại CỬA ĐỢI - HỘI AN (Q. NAM)  
Tên mẹ : PHẠM THỊ DỪA (sống)  
Tuổi : 50  
Nghề-nghiệp người mẹ: Đi mò tôm, cua, ở Khu ĐÔNG - HỘI AN -  
QUẢNG NAM.  
Địa-chỉ cha, mẹ: Làng NHẤT Khu ĐÔNG - HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.  
Nghề-nghiệp đương-sự: Đánh cá tại CỬA ĐÔNG HỐI - HỘI-viên  
"Ngư-Trưởng NHẬT LỆ".  
Học lực : Lớp Tư (biết đọc, biết viết)  
Giai cấp: Bần-nông (tuy nhiên gia đình được VC cấp 3 sào 3  
ruộng ở làng NHẤT, Khu ĐÔNG, HỘI AN năm 1947.  
Tôn-giáo : thờ tổ-tiên.  
Tình trạng gia-đình: Có vợ, 1 con (1 chết)  
Tên vợ : PHẠM THỊ NUÔI, 32 tuổi (năm 1929)  
Nghề-nghiệp người vợ: Đi mò cua, ốc, tôm (tuy nhiên nhà có  
1 sào 5 ruộng do VC cấp vào năm 1952).  
Tên người con thứ 1: không có (vì vừa lọt lòngra đã chết)-

...../...



B AN KHAI CUNG SƠ - LƯỢC

của

tên TRƯƠNG VAN HẢO tức NGUYỄN ĐÀI dùng ghe vượt tuyến vào Miền Nam hoạt-dộng cho V.C, bị bắt giữ tại Bến An-Đôn (Nai-Hiên) hồi 18 giờ ngày 5-6-1961.

-o-o-o-



I.- PHẦN LÝ LỊCH.

Họ tên : TRƯƠNG VAN HẢO (tên thật)  
- NGUYỄN ĐÀI (tên thẻ kiểm tra giả)  
- ĐẶNG ĐÀI (tên thẻ kiểm tra giả)

Ngày sinh và nơi sinh : Năm 1932 tại làng Hà-Khê, quận Châu-Thành Bà-Năng.

Nghề nghiệp : Đánh cá

Địa chỉ hiện tại : Ở rạp sông Nhật-Lệ, thị xã Quảng-Bình (Đắc vĩ-tuyên 17).

Cha mẹ : TRƯƠNG VAN ĐŨ (chết) và LÊ THỊ TÍN, 70 tuổi, buôn bán ở làng Hà-Khê (Bà-Năng).


Vợ con vợ lớn : NGUYỄN THỊ DUNG 27 tuổi, buôn bán, hồi năm 1955 y vẫn ở với mẹ chồng tại làng Hà-Khê (Bà-Năng) có một con nuôi, lúc tôi ra đi còn nhỏ không rõ đặt tên là gì và THỊ DUNG có lẽ đã đi lấy chồng khác rồi.

Vợ nhỏ : TRƯƠNG THỊ KÍNH 25 tuổi, làm cá, ở thôn Sông-Thành, thuộc khu phố Thành-Mỹ thị xã Quảng-Bình (Đắc vĩ tuyên 17) đã có hai con nhưng đã chết rồi, hiện nay đang có thai được 6 tháng.

Anh em ruột : Có người anh tên là TRƯƠNG VAN THİM, 44 tuổi, làm cá, ở làng Hà-Khê (Bà-Năng).


The Calu Case

(See Part I, section VI, C, 1, p. 28)



Map showing infiltration route from the North, including the Calu way station.

The cover of Calu mealbook No. 1



# GAO ĂN THƯỜNG 1A.

# Chức Phẩm ăn thường 1B!

Ngày	Số gạo	Cân lái	Thước Tỉn	nhân của ai	gửi của ?
1-11-60	60 long	60 long	120 MN	giao 10/100	giao 10/100
2-11-60	17C	64	6092	Thái	Phước 29
3-11-60	17C	63	6092	Thái	29
4-11-60	17C	60 long	6092	Thái	30
5-11-60	60 long	60 long	120 MN	giao 10/100	giao 10/100
6-11-60	9 long	9 long	184	Phước 10/100	Phước 10/100
7-11-60	17C	63 long	6092	Thái	Choi 10/100
8-11-60	17C	62 long	6092	Thái	10/100
9-11-60	17C	64 long	6092	Thái	10/100
10-11-60	17C	65	6092	Thái	10/100
11-11-60	17C	67 long	6092	Thái	10/100
12-11-60	17C	68 long	6092	Thái	10/100
13-11-60	17C	69 long	6092	Thái	10/100
14-11-60	17C	70 long	6092	Thái	10/100
15-11-60	17C	71 long	6092	Thái	10/100
16-11-60	17C	72 long	6092	Thái	10/100
17-11-60	17C	73 long	6092	Thái	10/100
18-11-60	17C	74 long	6092	Thái	10/100
19-11-60	17C	75 long	6092	Thái	10/100
20-11-60	17C	76 long	6092	Thái	10/100
21-11-60	17C	77 long	6092	Thái	10/100
22-11-60	17C	78 long	6092	Thái	10/100
23-11-60	17C	79 long	6092	Thái	10/100
24-11-60	17C	80 long	6092	Thái	10/100
25-11-60	17C	81 long	6092	Thái	10/100
26-11-60	17C	82 long	6092	Thái	10/100
27-11-60	17C	83 long	6092	Thái	10/100
28-11-60	17C	84 long	6092	Thái	10/100
29-11-60	17C	85 long	6092	Thái	10/100
30-11-60	17C	86 long	6092	Thái	10/100

Ngày	Vật gì?	Số bạc	Nhân của ai	gửi của ?
1-11-60	100 MN	100 MN	100 MN	100 MN
2-11-60	200 MN	200 MN	200 MN	200 MN
3-11-60	300 MN	300 MN	300 MN	300 MN
4-11-60	400 MN	400 MN	400 MN	400 MN
5-11-60	500 MN	500 MN	500 MN	500 MN
6-11-60	600 MN	600 MN	600 MN	600 MN
7-11-60	700 MN	700 MN	700 MN	700 MN
8-11-60	800 MN	800 MN	800 MN	800 MN
9-11-60	900 MN	900 MN	900 MN	900 MN
10-11-60	1000 MN	1000 MN	1000 MN	1000 MN
11-11-60	1100 MN	1100 MN	1100 MN	1100 MN
12-11-60	1200 MN	1200 MN	1200 MN	1200 MN
13-11-60	1300 MN	1300 MN	1300 MN	1300 MN
14-11-60	1400 MN	1400 MN	1400 MN	1400 MN
15-11-60	1500 MN	1500 MN	1500 MN	1500 MN
16-11-60	1600 MN	1600 MN	1600 MN	1600 MN
17-11-60	1700 MN	1700 MN	1700 MN	1700 MN
18-11-60	1800 MN	1800 MN	1800 MN	1800 MN
19-11-60	1900 MN	1900 MN	1900 MN	1900 MN
20-11-60	2000 MN	2000 MN	2000 MN	2000 MN
21-11-60	2100 MN	2100 MN	2100 MN	2100 MN
22-11-60	2200 MN	2200 MN	2200 MN	2200 MN
23-11-60	2300 MN	2300 MN	2300 MN	2300 MN
24-11-60	2400 MN	2400 MN	2400 MN	2400 MN
25-11-60	2500 MN	2500 MN	2500 MN	2500 MN
26-11-60	2600 MN	2600 MN	2600 MN	2600 MN
27-11-60	2700 MN	2700 MN	2700 MN	2700 MN
28-11-60	2800 MN	2800 MN	2800 MN	2800 MN
29-11-60	2900 MN	2900 MN	2900 MN	2900 MN
30-11-60	3000 MN	3000 MN	3000 MN	3000 MN

A sample page from Calu mealbook No. 1.



The two mealbooks, pages of which are reproduced in this appendix, were captured during a raid by Republic of Viet-Nam armed forces on a Viet Cong infiltration station at Calu in Quang Tri Province on March 29, 1961. Calu was station No. 8 along a secret trail that had at least 25 such way stations where Viet Cong infiltrators from North Viet-Nam were fed and rested as they moved into the South.

Notebook No. 1 is a monthly record (October 1960-March 1961) of food items received and consumed at the Calu station. Separate entries were made for rice and for other foods (meat, vegetables, et cetera). The date of each transaction is recorded together with the quantity of rice or other food, the price paid, the person from whom received, and other data.

Notebook No. 2 is a record of food served at the Calu station by individuals or units. The front part of the notebook lists men by name, apparently the members of a Viet Cong unit based at or near Calu. The size of the unit varied from 28 to 35 over the 6-month period.

The back pages of notebook No. 2 provide a record of "guests" served at the Calu station from October to March, sometimes with the number of men involved, sometimes with merely the name of the leader and the notation that a group accompanied him.

With the average daily per capita consumption of rice known, as well as the amount of rice delivered to each passing group, it is possible to estimate with fair accuracy the number of Viet Cong who moved through the Calu station during the October-to-March period. On this basis it is believed that approximately 1,840 VC personnel moved south along the Calu trail during those 6 months.

## The Tra Bong Case


(See Part I, section VI, C, 2, pp. 28-29)

A number of Viet Cong soldiers were killed in a fight with forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam at Tra Bong, Quang Ngai Province, in October 1960. Some of them (see below) had pictures of themselves wearing the uniform of the North Viet-Nam Army.



The Dakrotah Case

(See Part I, section VI, C, 3, p. 29)



*Route of Y Lon and fellow Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam to Dakrotah, where he was captured on October 23, 1960.*






*Picture of Y Lon (left) and three other highland tribesmen who were members of a Viet Cong unit and were captured at Dakrotah on October 23, 1960.*

BẢN KHAI CUNG

Của tên Y LON, đội-viên thuộc Trung-đội 3  
Đại-đội 3 /Tiểu-đoàn 20 V.C. bị Tiểu-đoàn  
2/41 bắt ngày 23/10/60 tại DakRotah (YB-965796)

- 0 -

I.- PHÂN CẬN CƯỚC VÀ LÝ LỊCH :



- Tên : Y LON
- Tuổi : 20 (không nhớ năm sinh. Chỉ nhớ 14 tuổi  
thi tập kết).
- Quê quán : Toumorong (QUẢNG NGÃI)
- Trình-độ văn-hóa : lớp 5 V.C. (tương đương đệ lục của ta).
- Cha mẹ : Chết từ hồi còn nhỏ
- Thân quyến : Không còn ai
- Gia cảnh : 1 vợ, không con
- Tên vợ : MUI
- Tuổi : 18
- Quê quán : Dak Dru Dok
- Cha mẹ vợ : O. A-XUNG và bà Y-DAM (không biết tuổi)
- Nghề-nghiệp : Làm rẫy ở Dak-Dru
- Thân-nhân vợ : không có

II.- LỜI KHAI TRONG ĐEM THĂM VẤN ĐẦU TIÊN TẠI SAIGON (25/10).

Tôi thuộc Tiểu-đội 2, Trung-đội 3, Đại-đội 3, Tiểu-  
đoàn 20 V.C., Quân số 111 người. Tôi bị bắt khi có nhiệm-vụ  
đi dò đường từ Dak-Dru xuống Dak Rotah cho đơn-vị tôi tiếp viện  
cho 1 đơn-vị khác ở Dak-Rotah.

Năm 1954, tôi 14 tuổi, làm bồi cho 1 tên Đại-úy Pháp.  
Sở dĩ tôi biết Đại-úy BELLO vì tôi có theo người Cò đem gà và  
gạo cho Đại-úy này luôn, lúc y ở tại DakTo. Tên này qua LÀO,  
tôi ở lại bị V.C. dọa chết đói nên theo V.C. tập kết.

## STATEMENT

of

Y LON, member of the 3d Platoon, 3d Company, 20th VC Battalion, who was captured by Battalion 2/41 on October 23, 1960, at Dakrotah

### I. Identification and personal history

Name : Y Lon  
Age : About 20 (does not remember year of birth but was about 14 when regrouped to North in 1954)  
Native village : Toumorong (Quang Ngai)  
Parents : Died when he was young  
Relatives : None  
Family status : Wife, no children  
Wife's name : Moi  
Wife's age : 18  
Native village : Dak Dru Dok  
Wife's parents : A Xung and Y Dam (ages unknown)  
Occupation : Farmers at Dak Dru  
Wife's relatives : None

### II. Chronology of activities

Served with the French Army at Toumorong. In 1954 . . . went to Binh Dinh on the train and arrived at Qui Nhon. After resting for 4 days and 4 nights at Qui Nhon I was regrouped to the North on a Polish ship. On the ship there were about 6,000 or 7,000 mountain tribesmen who were attached to the 120th Regiment. The regiment was commanded by Y Bloc, a Hre tribesman, and at the present time is stationed at Nghe An. At present it is called Su-doan 120 and is still commanded by Y Bloc. The ship docked at Sam Son and, after a stopover of 5 days there, went to Ha Long. I went to Gia Lam for cultural study at the "nationalities" school.

On May 1, 1959, the Viet Cong began to train me to educate my compatriots and on May 29 I left Gia Lam and went by car to Vinh Linh. . . . I arrived at Vinh Linh on June 1, 1959. After 2 days of rest at Vinh Linh, my group (which included 30 men) went out during the day on foot in order to cross the Ben Hai River. . . .

Immediately after we crossed the parallel, our group arrived at a contact point where there were four or five men who . . . showed us the way. After that, I do not know what places we passed through nor do I remember the date because we moved through the jungle. When we were near the Quang Nam border I remember that we stood on a mountain peak and looked at the ocean. I remember that we crossed Route 9 but I am not sure at what spot.

After leaving Quang Nam . . . we arrived at Mang Hon around August 1959 and reached Chieng 8 days later.

At Chieng, I went out with a group of Viet Cong cadre to propagandize among the tribal compatriots. About November 1959 we urged other tribal youths in the Chieng area to volunteer for military drill. A platoon of youths from Chieng was organized under the command of Vietnamese cadre. . . . They had military drill and they cleared land. . . .

[Y Lon gave details of his unit's attack on Dak Dru and of his capture together with three other Viet Cong the following day while carrying out a reconnaissance mission near Dakrotah.]

At the present time, in the remote areas of the southern plateau region, especially in the area of the Laos-Viet-Nam border, the Viet Cong have organized militia and self-defense units to guard the villages. They have forced the people to dig spiked ditches and have armed them with knives, machetes, and sticks, and some have bows with poison arrows.

Each time the Republic of Viet-Nam Army approaches a village, the self-defense militia guarding the village runs and reports to the Viet Cong troops and they use secret signals to inform the village people.

Ordinarily all our units are stationed in remote mountain areas far from the villages. Only the command cadres can enter the villages to contact the administrative units.

Usually we are given two types of training, military and political. Our program is organized as follows: in the morning from 5 to 11 o'clock we study physical training, politics, and the policies proposed for the national struggle; in the afternoon, we have military studies, especially on close combat fighting, bayonet attack, and post attacks.

Every day after we finish training, we indulge in sessions of stocktaking and criticism. But before these sessions the command cadre have met and reported to each other.

There is usually a shortage of food. Each day we receive two tins of rice which is supplied by the local people. We became more and more indifferent because they would never give us permission to visit our families. Parents did not know where their children were and were never allowed to see their children. The Viet Cong always said that "individuals do not count and must sacrifice themselves for the people and the Fatherland." . . .